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Abstract 
 
A certain type of counterfactual is thought to be intimately related to causation, control, and 
explanation. The time asymmetry of these phenomena therefore plausibly arises from a time 
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. But why is counterfactual dependence time 
asymmetric? The most influential account of the time asymmetry of counterfactual 
dependence is David Albert’s account, which posits a new, time-asymmetric fundamental 
physical law, the so-called “past hypothesis.” Albert argues that the time asymmetry of 
counterfactual dependence arises from holding fixed the past hypothesis when evaluating 
counterfactuals. In this paper, I argue that Albert’s account misconstrues the time asymmetry 
of counterfactual dependence. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A certain type of counterfactual that is typically expressed by subjunctive conditionals plays 
an important role in many areas of philosophy. Examples include “If the rock had not hit the 
window, then the window would not have shattered” and “If the match had been struck, then 
it would have lighted.” These counterfactuals are thought to be intimately related to 
causation (Hitchcock 2001; Lewis 1986b), control (Albert 2015; Kutach 2011; Loewer 2007, 
2012), and explanation (Lewis 1986a; Woodward 2003). Due to this connection, it is widely 
assumed that the time asymmetry of these phenomena arises from a time asymmetry of the 
relevant counterfactuals (cf. Lewis 1986c, 35–38; Loewer 2007, 324). But what accounts for 
the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence? 
 The most influential account of the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is 
David Albert’s (2000, 2015) entropic account, which adds a new, time-asymmetric 
fundamental physical law, the so-called “past hypothesis,” to our existing physical theories. 
Albert argues that holding the past hypothesis fixed in counterfactual reasoning gives rise to 
a time asymmetry that, among other things, explains why we cannot control the past. We 
might then hope to similarly explain other asymmetries that are associated with 
counterfactuals, including causation and explanation (see Loewer 2012). 
 In this paper, I will argue that Albert's account misconstrues the time asymmetry of 
counterfactual dependence. I will show that holding the past hypothesis fixed in 
counterfactual reasoning is explanatorily redundant in Albert’s own account of the time 
asymmetry of control. If his account explains why we cannot control the past conditional on 
the past hypothesis, then it would equally explain why we cannot control the past if the past 
hypothesis is not held fixed. Moreover, I will argue that not holding the past hypothesis fixed 
may even put us in a better position to account for the time asymmetries of control, causation, 
and explanation.1  
 
2. Counterfactuals and the Past Hypothesis 
 
To introduce the puzzle about the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence, it will be 
helpful to have a framework for evaluating counterfactuals. A plausible method for 
evaluating counterfactuals is the altered states recipe (see Maudlin 2007, 21–34 and Paul 
and Hall 2013, 47–53). Paul and Hall illustrate the recipe for counterfactuals of the form “If 
C had not occurred, E would not have occurred:”  
 
[C]onstruct a counterfactual state of the world at time t as much like the actual state at 
time t as possible, save for the fact that C does not occur. Think of taking the actual 
time-t state of the world, and ringing carefully localized changes on it just sufficient 
to make it the case that C does not occur…. We then evolve the resulting state forward 
                                                
1 Fernandes (forthcoming), Frisch (2007, 2010, 2014) and Price and Weslake (2009) also 
criticize Albert’s account. My criticism is different and aimed at Albert’s most recent 
statement of his theory (2015), which takes into account many of these earlier 
criticisms.  
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in time, in accordance with the actual laws of nature. If the resulting history yields E, 
the conditional is false; otherwise it is true. (Paul and Hall 2013, 47–48)  
 
Suppose Suzy throws a stone and the window shatters shortly thereafter. Now consider the 
counterfactual “If Suzy’s throw had not occurred, then the window shattering would not 
have occurred.” According to the altered states recipe, this counterfactual is evaluated as 
follows: We take a counterfactual state of the world that is as much like the actual state at 
the time of Suzy’s throw as possible, save for the fact that Suzy does not throw the stone. 
We then evolve this counterfactual state forward in accordance with the fundamental laws 
of nature to see whether the window shattering occurs in this counterfactual history. If the 
window shattering does not occur, then the counterfactual is true; otherwise, it is false.2  
 The altered states recipe is only a blueprint for evaluating counterfactuals. A full 
account would need to flesh out what exactly makes a state be the most similar state to the 
actual one where the antecedent of a counterfactual is true (Paul and Hall 2013, 50). For 
example, there are numerous counterfactual states in which Suzy does not throw a stone. 
Which of these states is most similar to the actual state? Is it a state where everything in the 
region where Suzy’s throw actually occurs is replaced by empty space? Or a state where 
Suzy is present but does something else? And if the latter, then what does Suzy do instead?  
 The altered states recipe, nonetheless, nicely illustrates the puzzle about the time 
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. Most of our best candidates for the fundamental 
dynamical laws of physics are deterministic in both temporal directions.3 According to these 
laws, the complete state of the world at any one time fixes a unique lawful future and a 
unique lawful past (Elga 2001, S318). Hence, we can take the state of the world at any one 
time and use the laws to evolve it both forward and backward to yield a complete history of 
the world. Moreover, deterministic laws entail that any counterfactual state that differs from 
the actual state yields not only a different future but also a different past. So, according to 
the altered states recipe, past events counterfactually depend on the present. How, then, can 
we account for the asymmetries that are associated with counterfactuals, in particular, the 
asymmetries of causation, control, and explanation?  
 Albert (2000, 2015) provides the currently most influential account of the time 
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.4 The main innovation of his account is that it 
                                                
2 I prefer the altered states recipe to the Lewis-Stalnaker framework, which evaluates 
counterfactuals in terms of similarity between possible worlds, for reasons given in 
Paul and Hall (2013, 42–49). I suspect that everything I say in this paper can be 
translated into a possible worlds framework. 
3 Most discussions of counterfactuals make this assumption (see Albert 2000, chap. 6; 
2015, chap. 2; Elga 2001, 315; Lewis 1986c, 37; Paul and Hall 2013, 27). The puzzle 
about the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence would still arise for 
indeterministic laws, as long as these laws specify probabilities in both temporal 
directions (cf. Field 2003, 437). See Maudlin (2007, 28–31) on how to adapt the altered 
states recipe for indeterministic laws. 
4 Lewis (1986c) is another influential theory, but see Elga (2001), Field (2003), and 
Frisch (2005, chap. 8) for decisive criticisms. Albert's account can be seen as a 
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assumes the so-called “past hypothesis” as a fundamental law of nature in addition to the 
fundamental dynamical laws. The past hypothesis is  
 
a new and explicitly non-time-reversal-symmetric fundamental law of nature … to the 
effect that the universe had some particular, simple, compact, symmetric, 
cosmologically sensible, very low-entropy initial macrocondition. (Albert 2015, 5; 
italics in the original) 
 
Three features of the past hypothesis will be important for what follows: First, since the past 
hypothesis is posited as an additional fundamental physical law, it rules out histories of the 
world that do not conform with it as nomologically impossible. Second, the past hypothesis 
is time asymmetric because it applies to the initial state of the universe. Third, the past 
hypothesis specifies that the initial state of the world has certain macroscopic properties 
(such as low entropy) but leaves open its exact microscopic properties.  
 Albert argues that his account of the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence 
is compatible with most methods for evaluating counterfactuals as long as they do “not 
introduce any asymmetry between the past and the future over and above the asymmetry 
which is introduced by the past hypothesis” (Albert 2015, 42). To have something concrete 
to work with, I will treat Albert’s proposal as a way of supplementing the altered states 
recipe, which meets Albert’s condition because it introduces no asymmetry into how 
counterfactuals are evaluated.  
An implicit restriction in the altered states recipe is that when we look for the most 
similar state to the actual state that makes the antecedent of some counterfactual true, we 
only consider counterfactual states that are compatible with the fundamental dynamical laws. 
After all, the recipe tells us to evolve the modified state forward and backward in accordance 
with the fundamental laws, and this is only possible if the modified state is compatible with 
the fundamental dynamical laws. We can then add the past hypothesis to the altered states 
recipe by assuming that the most similar state that makes the antecedent true also must be 
compatible with the past hypothesis.5  
 Even with the past hypothesis added to the altered states recipe, the past still 
counterfactually depends on the present. If the fundamental dynamical laws are 
deterministic, as Albert assumes they are, then any state that differs from the actual present 
state in any way at all lawfully entails a different past (cf. Loewer 2012). So it still needs to 
be shown how evaluating counterfactuals in accordance with the past hypothesis gives rise 
to the time asymmetries of causation, control, and explanation. 
 
                                                
development of Lewis’s theory that avoids these problems (see Loewer 2007). 
5 Albert also posits a “statistical postulate” that supplies a probability distribution over 
microstates compatible with the past hypothesis. It says (roughly) that every microstate 
is equally likely. He argues that eligible counterfactual microstates need to be such that 
the “associated macrohistories are assigned reasonable probability values by the 
statistical postulate” (Albert 2015, 41–42). This constraint will not matter for my 
criticism of Albert’s account. 
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3. The Time Asymmetry of Control 
  
Albert argues that understanding counterfactuals in terms of the past hypothesis accounts for 
the “time asymmetry of control,” that is, the fact that agents like us can control the future 
but not the past. He says little about the other asymmetries, but it is implied that they can be 
explained along similar lines (see Loewer 2012, 132). In this and the next section, I will 
criticize Albert’s account of the time asymmetry of control by arguing that his appeal to the 
past hypothesis is explanatorily redundant.  
 Albert’s account of the time asymmetry of control has two parts. First, he argues that 
the past hypothesis limits influence over the past such that “any creature which we might 
imaginably be tempted to treat as an agent … seems likely to be in a position to influence 
much about the future and next to nothing about the past” (Albert 2015, 44). Second, he 
argues that this limited influence does not allow us to control the past because “whatever 
opportunities there may be to influence the past are either rare or impractical or invisible or 
in some other way beside the point” (2015, 52).  
 With regard to the first part, Albert adopts what he calls the “fiction of agency,” 
whose upshot is that we have “direct and unmediated and freely exercised control” (italics 
in the original) only over a small part of the world’s present state, such as regions of our 
brains or the locations of our hands and feet (2015, 42). For simplicity, I will assume that 
the small region we have direct control over concerns events in our brains that I will call 
“decisions.” Nothing hinges on this assumption, as long as the region of the present that we 
have direct control over is small.  
Albert further assumes that we can influence past and future events only to the extent 
that they counterfactually depend on the present region over which we have direct control. 
Suppose I face a decision between snapping my fingers and not snapping my fingers. We 
can determine the extent to which my decision influences the past as follows. Take two 
complete states of the world that are as much like the actual state of the world at the time of 
my decision as possible. The two states, however, differ from each other in that in one I 
decide to snap my fingers and in the other I decide not to snap my fingers. My decision can 
thus be understood as a choice about which of these two states to make actual. We then take 
each of the two complete states of the world and evolve it backward in accordance with the 
fundamental physical laws, yielding a complete past history of the world. My decision 
influences those past events that occur in one history but not in the other.  
 Albert argues that due to the past hypothesis, our influence over the past is extremely 
limited. He argues that the past hypothesis gives rise to the time asymmetry of records, that 
is, the fact that we have records of the past but not of the future. Records are localized events, 
such as photographs, memories, or footprints, that allow us to infer with high probability 
that certain events at other times (viz., the events remembered, photographed, etc.) have 
occurred.6 It is not obvious why events like photographs or memories are reliable records of 
the past. The fundamental dynamical laws allow many ways for these events to come into 
existence such that they would not be correlated with the past events they appear to represent. 
                                                
6 See, e.g., Albert (2000, chap. 6), Frisch (2014, 224–28), and Horwich (1987, chap. 5) 
for more discussion of records. 
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For example, they allow that my current self and all photographs of my alleged childhood 
are the result of a fluctuation from a state of higher entropy. In this case, all of these 
photographs would be radically misleading. Albert argues that the past hypothesis (together 
with the dynamical laws and plausible statistical assumptions) makes it very likely that most 
records of the past are reliable. This point is controversial, but I will grant it for what 
follows.7  
 Most past events, according to Albert, do not depend on our present decisions 
because they have many current records that exist outside of our decisions. For example, my 
past trip to Paris is currently recorded in my memories, photographs, and credit card receipts. 
A counterfactual difference in my decision, which according to the myth of agency only 
corresponds to a small difference at the present time, leaves these records intact. So if we 
take a counterfactual state compatible with the past hypothesis that differs from the actual 
state only with respect to my decision and evolve it backward in accordance with the 
fundamental physical laws, then these records assure that it is very probable that my past 
visit to Paris would still have occurred. Thus, my past visit to Paris does not counterfactually 
depend on my current decision. The same holds for all other past events of which there are 
sufficiently many present records that exist outside of my decisions (cf. Loewer 2012, 128). 
At the same time, the future depends on our present decisions more extensively because 
there is no ‘future hypothesis’ and so most future events do not have present records.  
 Holding fixed the past hypothesis (that is, only considering counterfactual states that 
are compatible with it) is crucial for this account. It is not enough that there are actual present 
records of me having been in Paris. These records also need to remain reliable in the 
counterfactual scenario where I make a different decision. Elga (2001, S323–24) shows that 
if we evaluate counterfactuals only in accordance with the fundamental dynamical laws—
and without the past hypothesis—then any small counterfactual change to the present likely 
will lawfully entail a counter-entropic past. Given such a counter-entropic past, alleged 
present records of the past would be radically misleading (more on this later). Holding the 
past hypothesis fixed makes such a counter-entropic past, in which current records are 
unreliable, highly unlikely (Loewer 2007, 315–16). So evaluating counterfactuals in 
accordance with the past hypothesis limits our influence over the past because it ensures that 
records are counterfactually stable.  
 
4. The Redundancy of the Past Hypothesis 
 
The next step for Albert is to show that we cannot use the limited influence over the past that 
the past hypothesis does allow to control the past. In this section, I will argue that Albert’s 
reasons for why we cannot use this influence to control the past make his appeal to the past 
hypothesis explanatorily redundant. If these reasons explain why we cannot use the influence 
over the past that we would have despite holding the past hypothesis fixed to control the 
                                                
7 Albert is not always clear about whether the past hypothesis (together with the 
statistical postulate) is sufficient for the reliability of (many of) our current records, but, 
as far as I can see, his account of the time asymmetry of control requires this 
assumption. See Frisch (2007, 2014) for discussion of Albert’s account of records.  
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past, then they equally explain why we could not use the more extensive influence that we 
would have without holding the past hypothesis fixed to control the past.  
 Albert’s account allows that we can influence past outcomes that have no current 
records or where our decision itself is a record of the outcome. I will follow Albert in calling 
the former cases “Elga cases” and the latter cases “Frisch cases,” after the philosophers who 
discovered them. Albert needs additional reasons for why we cannot control the past in Elga 
and Frisch cases, where our decisions do influence the past.  
 Elga cases concern circumstances where some past outcome has no present record. 
Suppose all macroscopic records of the existence of Atlantis have since vanished into 
microscopic noise. It is then compatible with the past hypothesis that my present decision 
to, say, snap my fingers influences whether Atlantis did or did not exist (Albert 2015, 47). 
Suppose that if I had decided to snap my fingers, then Atlantis would not have existed, but 
if I had decided to not snap my fingers, then Atlantis would have existed.8  
 Albert’s reason for why we cannot control the past in Elga cases generalizes as 
follows:  
 
Ignorance. I cannot control an outcome that, in certain circumstances, depends on my 
decision if “I can have no way whatsoever of knowing, and I can have no grounds 
whatsoever for suspecting, when it is that [these circumstances] actually obtain!” (Albert 
2015, 48) 
 
Ignorance explains why I cannot control whether Atlantis existed. Even if Atlantis’s 
existence does in certain circumstances counterfactually depend on my decision, I still have 
no way of knowing when I am in these circumstances and in which way it depends on my 
decision. In particular, I have no way of knowing whether Atlantis would have existed if I 
had decided to snap my fingers but not otherwise or whether Atlantis would not have existed 
if I had snapped my fingers but would have existed otherwise. So I cannot use my influence 
over Atlantis’s existence to further a particular desired end. Ignorance, however, does not 
apply to all cases of influence over the past.  
 Frisch cases concern circumstances where an agent’s present decision itself is a 
record of some past outcome. Frisch (2007, 2014) gives an example of such circumstances 
that I will quote in full:  
 
While playing a piano piece that I know well, I am unsure whether I am currently 
playing a part of the piece that is repeated in the score for the first or the second time. 
I decide to play the second ending rather than repeating the part. Many of the notes I 
play, of course, I play without choosing or deciding to play them. But in the case I am 
imagining the question what notes to play next has arisen, and I consciously choose to 
play the second ending. Since I have learned from experience that when I play a piece 
I know well my decisions to play certain notes are good evidence for where I am in 
the piece, my present decision not to repeat the part constitutes good evidence for a 
certain past event—my having already played the part in question once. We can even 
                                                
8 Albert (2015) and Loewer (2012) attribute this case to Adam Elga. 
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imagine that I have a vague and unreliable memory of having already played the part. 
My decision to play the second ending, then, can constitute additional evidence for the 
reliability of my memory. (Frisch 2014, 222) 
 
My decision to play the second ending in this case is a record of me having already played 
the first ending. Moreover, Frisch stipulates that there are not sufficiently many other present 
records of which notes I have played in the past to screen of its dependence on my current 
decision. My decision then influences which notes I have played in the past.9  
 Ignorance does not apply to Frisch cases. Since my decision is a record of whether I 
have already played the first ending, I can have evidence that whether I have already played 
it depends on my decision. For example, I might have learned from past instances where 
there were independent records that my decision to play the second ending is reliably 
correlated with whether I have already played the first ending (Frisch 2014, 222). So I can 
know that which notes I have already played depends on my decision in these circumstances.  
 In response to Frisch cases, Albert spells out two further circumstances in which we 
cannot use our influence for control.10 He defends two conditions such that if at least one of 
these conditions is met in a particular case, it is not a case of control. He argues that each 
condition alone suffices to explain why we cannot control the past in Frisch cases. The first 
condition is:   
 
Correlation. I cannot control an outcome that depends, in certain circumstances, on my 
decision if there are lawlike correlations between my decisions and the decisions of another 
(possible) agent.11 
 
The main idea seems to be this: If my decision is a record of some past outcome (just as the 
decision of Frisch’s piano player is a record of what notes she has played in the past), then 
there could be another agent whose decision also is a record of the same outcome. In this 
case, since each agent’s decision is correlated with the same past outcome, the agents’ 
decisions would also be correlated with each other (Albert 2015, 45). Albert argues that an 
agent could not then consistently treat her decision as being under her control since it could 
be correlated with another agent’s independent decision. So the pianist in Frisch’s example 
could not simultaneously treat herself as having control over her present decision and treat 
                                                
9 One might question the inference from my decision being one of very few records of 
what notes I have played in the past to my decision thereby influencing what notes I 
have played. Albert (2015, 48), however, grants this inference, and so I will do the 
same at least for the sake of the argument. Fernandes (forthcoming) and Kutach (2011, 
252) also accept the inference. 
10 Albert credits Fernandes (forthcoming) with talking him out of a different response to 
Frisch cases.  
11 See Albert (2015: 49). It is not fully clear whether Albert thinks that the other agent 
needs to be actual or merely conceivable. However, if the other agent needs to be 
actual, then the reason is unlikely to apply to all Frisch cases since there likely will not 
always be such an agent.   
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that decision as a record of what notes she has played in the past. Else, she would have to 
acknowledge that her decision could be correlated with another agent’s independent 
decision, which, according to Albert, is incompatible with “any fiction (that is) about those 
two decisions, as the free and spontaneous acts of two separate and autonomous agents” 
(Albert 2015, 49). I will say more about this argument in Section 5, but for now I want to 
move on to Albert’s other reason.  
 Albert’s other reason for why we have no control in Frisch cases is: 
 
Fragility. I cannot control an outcome that depends, in certain circumstances, on my 
decision if the dependence “turns out to have none of the robustness, and none of the 
flexibility, and none of the utility, that come along with familiar idea[s] of what it might 
amount [to] to exercise ‘intentional control.’” (Albert 2015, 51) 
 
Albert points out that in ordinary cases of control, for example, when my decision influences 
whether a door is open, the dependence holds across a wide range of deliberational contexts. 
For example, if I had decided to open the door because I wanted to go to the bank instead of 
the office, the opening of the door would still have depended on my decision. Albert argues 
that if there is an influence that only obtains in very specific deliberational contexts, then it 
does not count as control.  
 Fragility is supposed to explain why Frisch’s pianist example is not an instance of 
control over the past. Albert points out that having already played the first ending depends 
on my decision to play the second ending only in very specific deliberational contexts, and 
so the dependence cannot be utilized for practical purposes: 
 
[I]f (for example) I make any attempt at exploiting that counterfactual dependence in 
the service of making a profit; if (say) I play the second ending because somebody 
offers me a million dollars to bring it about that I have already played the first one, 
then it simply isn’t going to work—because in that case the evidential connection 
between my decision to play the second ending and my already having played the first 
is going to be broken, is going to be screened off, by my having made that decision for 
the money. (Albert 2015, 50; italics in the original) 
 
I will eventually question whether Albert’s reliance on Fragility is compatible with his own 
provision against introducing unexplained temporal asymmetries, but I want to postpone this 
discussion until Section 5. For now, it is only important that Albert needs Ignorance and at 
least one of Correlation and Fragility to account for the time asymmetry of control.  
 Holding fixed the past hypothesis then is not needed for Albert’s account to explain 
why we cannot control the past. I will argue that if Ignorance, Correlation, and Fragility 
explain why we cannot control the past if we hold the past hypothesis fixed in our account 
of counterfactuals, then they would equally explain why we cannot control the past if we do 
not hold the past hypothesis fixed. The past hypothesis restricts counterfactual histories to 
ones that start with the same initial macrostate as the actual universe. If counterfactuals are 
evaluated without the past hypothesis, then the past can counterfactually depend on our 
decisions a lot more than otherwise because the universe then could have started in a 
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different macrostate. Moreover, if Albert is right about the role of the past hypothesis in 
assuring the reliability of records (as I assume he is), then without the past hypothesis even 
events that do have many present records outside of our decisions can counterfactually 
depend on our decisions.  
 But Ignorance, Correlation, and Fragility would still explain why we cannot use the 
more extensive influence over the past that we would have if the past hypothesis is not held 
fixed to control the past. We can still divide cases where our decisions influence the past into 
two classes: cases where your decision is a record of the outcome in question (Frisch-style 
cases) and cases where your decision is not a record of the outcome in question (Elga-style 
cases). Let us start with the latter cases. Without the past hypothesis, past outcomes can 
depend on your decision even if these outcomes have multiple macroscopic records that exist 
outside of your decision. For example, there are a lot of current records of Rome’s existence. 
Yet without the past hypothesis, the past existence of Rome may still counterfactually 
depend on your current decision, say, to snap or not snap your fingers. Would this give you 
control over Rome’s existence? 
 If Albert is right that Ignorance explains why you lack control over the existence of 
Atlantis in the original Elga case, then it equally explains why you would lack control over 
the existence of Rome in this case. If we do not hold the past hypothesis fixed, then the 
existence of Rome may depend on your decision to snap your fingers despite having multiple 
present records. But you still could not use this dependence to further any desired ends 
because when you make the decision, you do not know in which way Rome’s existence 
depends on it. It might be that if you were to decide to snap your fingers, Rome would not 
have existed. But it equally might be that Rome would not have existed if you were to decide 
to not snap your fingers. Of course, it seems absurd that Rome’s existence would depend on 
your decision at all. But Albert already entertains the equally unintuitive possibility that 
Atlantis’s existence and other past events may depend on your decisions.  
 In Frisch-style cases your decision itself is a reliable record of the past outcome. If 
we do not hold fixed the past hypothesis, there can be Frisch-style cases even in 
circumstances where the past outcome has many records that exist outside of your decision. 
But if Correlation and Fragility explain why we cannot control the past in the original Frisch 
case, then they also would explain why we cannot control the past in these additional cases. 
Correlation applies to the original Frisch case because my decision to play the second ending 
is a record of me having already played the first ending. It then would also apply to these 
other Frisch-style cases where my decision also is a record of the relevant outcome. The 
same is true for Fragility. Albert argues that Fragility applies to Frisch’s pianist case because 
in a deliberational context where I decide to play the second ending for a different reason, 
the different reason would screen off the original correlation; so my decision would no 
longer be a record of me having already played the first ending. Albert does not defend why 
this screening off happens, but we have reason to believe that if it happens in the original 
Frisch case, then it still would happen in the additional Frisch-style cases that we would get 
without holding the past hypothesis fixed. (In fact, I will argue shortly that Fragility is more 
plausible if our account of counterfactuals does not hold the past hypothesis fixed.) 
 So holding fixed the past hypothesis is doing no work in Albert’s account of the time 
asymmetry of control. The account rests on the plausibility of Ignorance, Correlation, and 
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Fragility. If these conditions explain why we cannot control the past conditional on the past 
hypothesis, then they also explain why we cannot control the past if the past hypothesis is 
not held fixed. So Albert misconstrues the time asymmetry of control. It does not arise from 
holding fixed the past hypothesis but from the further conditions he imposes on control.  
 
5. A Problem for Albert’s Account 
 
In the rest of the paper, I will argue that we may even get a better account of the asymmetry 
of control and related asymmetries if we do not hold the past hypothesis fixed when 
evaluating counterfactuals. I will point out a problem that exists for Albert’s account and 
show that we can get around this problem by evaluating counterfactuals without the past 
hypothesis. My argument has two parts: First, I will argue that Albert can deal with Frisch 
cases only if Fragility applies to these cases. Second, I will argue that Albert has no 
explanation of why Fragility applies to Frisch cases, but there is such an explanation if we 
do not hold the past hypothesis fixed in counterfactual reasoning.  
 Albert needs Fragility in order to have a plausible reply to Frisch cases. Ignorance 
does not apply to Frisch cases because in these cases we can know that the past outcome 
depends on our decisions. So Albert can only rely on Correlation or Fragility to deal with 
Frisch cases. Correlation says that we do not have control over a decision if the decision is 
(or might be) lawfully correlated with another agent’s decision. But Correlation is not 
plausible as a constraint on control for two reasons. First, it would prove too much. Consider 
two experienced firefighters. When they enter a burning building, they pick up on many 
subtle clues and act accordingly. It is then plausible that their respective decisions are 
correlated. For example, if one firefighter decides to leave the burning building because she 
senses that it is not safe, it is very likely that the other firefighter will decide the same. In 
such cases, where two experts make decisions based on the same evidence, there plausibly 
are lawlike correlations between their decisions.12 If Correlation were to rule out control, the 
firefighters would lack control over their decisions in these circumstances. Yet it seems clear 
that they could have control.  
 Second, it is not clear what the rationale for Correlation is in the first place. Albert’s 
“fiction of agency” grants that an agent having control over her decisions is compatible with 
determinism. So control is assumed to be compatible with the fact that our decisions are a 
logical consequence of events in the distant past and the laws of nature. But if we can 
maintain control in light of determinism, it is hard to see why we cannot also maintain control 
in light of lawful correlations between our decisions and those of other agents. 13  So 
                                                
12 See Holton (2006) who argues that experts’ decisions can function like measurement 
devices. Frisch (2007, 2014) cites Holton as the inspiration for his pianist case.  
13  Albert’s “fiction of agency” is ambiguous. Does it require that we can rationally 
maintain the belief that we have control over our decisions (even though the belief 
might be false)? Or does it require that we actually have such control? My criticism of 
Correlation applies either way. If the fiction is compatible with determinism, then it 
should also be compatible with lawlike correlations between our decisions and other 
agents’ decisions.  
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Correlation cannot explain why we cannot control the past in Frisch cases or any other cases. 
The burden of explaining why we cannot control the past in Frisch cases thus falls to 
Fragility.  
 Fragility is a plausible requirement for control. It says that we cannot control 
outcomes that, in particular circumstances, counterfactually depend on our decisions if this 
dependence would not continue to hold in deliberational contexts where we make the same 
decision for a different reason. As Albert points out, in Frisch’s pianist case, having already 
played the first ending counterfactually depends on the pianist’s decision to play the second 
ending only if that decision is made for a specific reason. The dependence, therefore, is 
extremely fragile and so the pianist cannot use it to promote desired ends.  
 Albert’s account of why Fragility applies to Frisch cases, however, presupposes an 
unexplained time asymmetry. Albert argues that Fragility applies to Frisch cases because the 
relevant evidential correlations between our decisions and past outcomes are 
counterfactually fragile. He points out that in the pianist case, if I were to make the same 
decision for a different reason, my decision would no longer be a record of having already 
played the first ending. At the same time, Albert emphasizes that there is no such fragility 
with regard to evidential correlations between our decisions and future outcomes. For 
example, if I were to base my decision to open some door on a different reason, my decision 
typically would still be correlated with the door being open in the future (Albert 2015, 50). 
This asymmetry is meant to account for why Fragility rules out control over the past in Frisch 
cases but does not rule out control over the future. I think Albert is right about the existence 
of this asymmetry of fragility. But what explains this asymmetry?  
 At some point, Albert seems to suggest that the dependence of past events on our 
decisions is fragile because our reasons for a decision “screen off” evidential correlations 
between the decision and past outcomes (Albert 2015, 50). But this assumption would 
already presuppose a time asymmetry in our agency. An agent’s reasons for a decision 
plausibly screen off correlations between the decision and past outcomes only if these 
reasons occur in the immediate past of the decision: as (causal or nomological) 
intermediaries between the decision and the past outcome. And while reasons for action may 
always precede decisions in agents like us, Price (2007) points out that we can conceive of 
agents whose reasons occur in the immediate future of their decisions. Such agents’ reasons, 
hence, would not screen off correlations between their decisions and past outcomes. So if 
fragility is merely a consequence of the fact that reasons for action precede our decisions, 
then Albert’s account would at most explain why agent whose deliberation is time 
asymmetric cannot control the past. Yet Albert’s goal is to explain for “any creature which 
we might imaginably be tempted to treat as an agent” (Albert 2015, 44) why this creature 
could not control the past.14  
                                                
14 There is a legitimate project that uses asymmetries in our local environment to explain 
our asymmetric perspective as agents and then uses this asymmetric perspective to 
explain why we cannot control the past (see, e.g., Fernandes forthcoming and Price and 
Weslake 2009). But this is not Albert’s project. Albert wants to explain why any agent 
would be unable to control the past due to asymmetries in our world’s objective 
counterfactual structure (cf. Blanchard 2016, 261).  
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 Albert is explicit that a full account of the time asymmetry of control cannot 
presuppose any unexplained time asymmetry. He points out that our algorithm for evaluating 
counterfactuals should “not introduce any asymmetry between the past and the future over 
and above the asymmetry which is introduced by the past hypothesis” (Albert 2015, 42). 
Moreover, when he introduces his “fiction of agency,” he emphasizes that we “want to make 
certain—as with the algorithm for evaluating counterfactuals—that whatever particular 
fiction we choose does not introduce any new asymmetries of its own between past and 
future” (Albert 2015, 43). So if Fragility is supposed to explain why we cannot control the 
past in Frisch cases, then it has to follow from evaluating counterfactuals in accordance with 
the past hypothesis that any dependence of past outcomes on agents’ decisions in these cases 
is fragile. In the next section, I will argue that Albert’s account does not have the resources 
to establish this fragility. However, we do get such an account if we do not hold the past 
hypothesis fixed when evaluating counterfactuals.  
 
6. Counterfactuals without the Past Hypothesis 
 
How could it follow, without any time-asymmetric assumptions about agents, that the 
dependence of past events on agents’ decisions in Frisch cases is always fragile? Here is a 
natural proposal: A counterfactual difference in an agent’s reason for a decision would 
plausibly be reflected in at least some small difference in present circumstances. This 
assumption is not time asymmetric since it is plausible regardless of whether the reason is in 
the past or in the future of the decision. Now suppose we can show that any small difference 
in present circumstances would make it that the dependence of past outcomes on the agent’s 
decision would no longer hold, where the same is not true for the future. It would then follow 
that in the special case where a present difference is due to a difference in the agent’s reason 
for the decision, the dependence also would no longer hold. Hence, we would have a story 
of how the required fragility in Frisch cases follows from a general asymmetry of 
counterfactual dependence.15  
There is no straightforward way of getting this fragility in all Frisch cases if we hold 
the past hypothesis fixed. The past hypothesis, remember, was introduced to assure that 
records are counterfactually stable. In particular, Albert’s account of why our influence over 
the past is extremely limited presupposes that most current records of past events are not 
counterfactually fragile against small differences in the state of the world outside of the 
records. For example, it presupposes that the memories and credit card receipts of my past 
trip to Paris still would have been records if I had made a different decision right now. 
Why then should counterfactual dependence be fragile in Frisch cases? Albert grants 
that in Frisch cases a past outcome counterfactually depends on the agent’s decision because 
the decision is a record of the outcome. As we have just seen, holding fixed the past 
hypothesis is supposed to ensure that records are counterfactually stable against small 
differences in the state of the world outside of the records. Moreover, a counterfactual 
difference in an agent’s reason for a decision will (at least typically) only amount to a small 
                                                
15  There might be other time-symmetric ways of showing that the dependence of past 
outcomes on our decisions in Frisch cases is always fragile, but this way is very natural. 
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difference in present circumstances. So if we hold fixed the past hypothesis, we expect that 
if the agent had made the same decision for a different reason, her decision would have 
remained a record of the past outcome. Hence, the outcome still would have depended on 
the decision.  
 There might be some difference between ordinary circumstances and Frisch cases 
such that records are counterfactually stable in ordinary circumstances but not in Frisch 
cases. In particular, in ordinary circumstances past outcomes tend to have many records, 
whereas in Frisch cases they only have few other records in addition to the agent’s decision. 
However, a main purpose of holding the past hypothesis fixed is to ensure the counterfactual 
stability of records. So some substantial argument would be required to show that it succeeds 
to do so in ordinary circumstances but not in Frisch cases. At the very least, no story has 
been provided of how we get fragility in Frisch cases if we hold the past hypothesis fixed. 
By contrast, I will argue that the required fragility follows naturally if we evaluate 
counterfactuals without holding the past hypothesis fixed.  
Following the altered states recipe, we evaluate counterfactuals by taking the 
complete state of the world in which the antecedent of the counterfactual is true that is most 
similar to the actual state and evolving it backward and forward in accordance with the 
fundamental dynamical laws. Holding the past hypothesis fixed would require us to ignore 
any states that are incompatible with the actual initial macrostate of the universe as 
candidates for the most similar state. I propose that we give up this restriction such that the 
most similar state to the actual state in which the antecedent of a counterfactual is true may 
be one that lawfully entails a different initial macrostate. In the following, I will argue that 
allowing these additional states as candidates for the most similar state provides additional 
resources for explaining why we cannot control the past.  
Counterfactual dependence still is time asymmetric even if we do not hold the past 
hypothesis fixed. The actual present state of the universe is time asymmetric in that it 
lawfully entails a very special, low-entropy macroscopic past but it does not lawfully entail 
a low-entropy macroscopic future. We can make this time asymmetry more precise by 
bringing in considerations from Statistical Mechanics (see, e.g., Albert 2000; Elga 2001; 
Horwich 1987). The entropy of our universe (and of relatively isolated subsystems) tends to 
increase toward the future but it is extremely unlikely to decrease. For example, heat 
spontaneously flows from hotter bodies to colder bodies and gases expand throughout their 
available volumes, but we never observe the time-reverse behavior.  
The Boltzmannian tradition in Statistical Mechanics tries to explain the unlikeliness 
of entropy decrease toward the future in terms of the scarcity of the relevant microstates. We 
can represent all microstates that are compatible with the current macrostate of our universe 
in an abstract space called “phase space.” Each point in this space represents a fully specified 
microstate of the world. It turns out that the overwhelming majority of microstates 
compatible with the current macrostate, including the overwhelming majority of microstates 
in the immediate vicinity in phase space to the actual microstate, lawfully entail that entropy 
increases toward the future. Microstates that lawfully entail that entropy decreases toward 
the future, by contrast, are extremely rare. If we then add probabilistic assumptions that say 
(roughly) that each possible microstate is equally likely, it follows that it is extremely 
unlikely that our universe is in a microstate such that entropy will decrease toward the future.  
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It does not matter for my argument whether this explanation succeeds. It only matters 
that microstates that lawfully entail that entropy decreases toward the future are in fact 
extremely rare. Moreover, the same is true for the past. Since the fundamental dynamical 
laws are (small possible exceptions aside) time-reversal invariant, microstates compatible 
with the current macrostate that lawfully entail that entropy was lower in the past are also 
extremely rare. But there is an important difference between past and future: The entropy of 
our universe will be higher in the future. So the actual macroscopic future is typical in the 
sense that most microstates that are compatible with the current macrostate would also 
lawfully entail a macroscopic future of higher entropy that, at least over a short time-period, 
is macroscopically similar to the actual future. But entropy was lower in the past. So the 
actual macroscopic past is atypical since the overwhelming majority of possible microstates, 
including the overwhelming majority of microstates in the immediate vicinity in phase space 
to the actual microstate, would lawfully entail a macroscopic past of higher entropy that is 
radically different from the actual, low-entropy past.16 
This atypicality of the past history of our universe entails that the macroscopic past 
of systems is extremely sensitive to small changes in their end state. Most possible 
microstates, including the ones in the immediate vicinity of the actual microstate in phase 
space, would lawfully entail a very different macroscopic past. So almost any small 
difference in the actual microstate will yield a microstate that lawfully entails a macroscopic 
past that is extremely different from the actual past. Elga (2001) illustrates this sensitivity 
with the example of an egg that is cracked and cooked in a frying pan. Most alternative 
microstates that differ from the actual microstate of the world at the time when the egg is 
cooked would lawfully entail a macroscopic past where the egg never got cracked but was 
cooked all along. (Such a past strikes us as strange because all cooked eggs that we actually 
observe have been cracked and cooked. But the actual past nonetheless is atypical in that 
most possible microstates would lawfully entail a different macroscopic past.)  
The sensitivity of systems’ past histories to small changes in their end state entails 
that any dependence of past events on our current decisions is extremely fragile. Most 
microstates that are similar to the actual state but in which some decision of mine is different 
lawfully entail a different macroscopic past in which many actual past events would not have 
occurred. So if we do not hold the past hypothesis fixed, many past macroscopic events 
plausibly counterfactually depend on my current decisions. This dependence, however, is 
extremely fragile: while these events actually counterfactually depend on my decision, if 
circumstances were even slightly different, then (in the resulting counterfactual 
                                                
16  See Elga (2001). Albert (2000, 151) uses the same fact for a different purpose. A 
foundational question in Statistical Mechanics concerns why entropy was not also 
higher in the past. This is the so-called “reversibility objection.” Albert’s past 
hypothesis, which is time asymmetric, is intended to solve this problem by motivating a 
“loop-sided” probability measure according to which entropy is overwhelmingly like to 
increase toward the future but not toward the past. This possible role of the past 
hypothesis in explaining the entropic time asymmetry, however, leaves open whether 
we should hold it fixed when evaluating counterfactuals (see Section 7). 
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circumstances) the events in question would no longer counterfactually depend on my 
decision.  
Take any past macroscopic event D that counterfactually depends on a given agent’s 
decision. Because of the atypicality of the actual macroscopic past, it is extremely likely that 
D also depends on numerous other present events outside of the agent’s decision. More 
specifically, any counterfactual difference in the present microstate almost certainly would 
have resulted in a radically different macroscopic past that does not include D. But in such 
counterfactual situations where D does not occur due to some difference other than the 
agent’s decision, D also no longer counterfactually depends on the agent’s decision. This is 
for the following reason: Only a tiny proportion of possible microstates lawfully entail a 
macroscopic past that includes D. So if we take the counterfactual situation (where present 
circumstances outside of the decision are different and D does not occur) and change it such 
that the agent’s decision does not occur, the resulting microstate almost certainly also would 
lawfully entail a past history that does not include D. Hence, if circumstances outside of the 
agent’s decision had been even slightly different, then in the resulting counterfactual 
situation D would not have occurred regardless of the agent’s decision. So, macroscopic past 
events that actually counterfactually depend on an agent’s decision would no longer 
counterfactually depend on the decision if present circumstances were even slightly 
different.  
This fragility explains why we cannot control the past in Frisch cases. Let me remind 
you of Albert’s Fragility condition. Suppose whether your front door opens counterfactually 
depends on your decision to open the door. But now also suppose (unrealistically) that if 
your reason for making the decision had been in any way different, the door would not have 
opened regardless of whether you had decided to open it or not. Albert’s Fragility condition 
entails that we would lack control in such cases because the resulting dependence is not 
stable across deliberational contexts (Albert 2015, 51). 
The above considerations show that if we evaluate counterfactuals without holding 
the past hypothesis fixed, then any dependence of the past on our decisions is fragile in this 
sense. Many macroscopic past events counterfactually depend on agents’ decisions. But if 
circumstances outside of the agent’s decision were even slightly different, this dependence 
would no longer hold. Moreover, differences in an agent’s reason for a decision amount to 
at least a small difference in the present circumstances outside of the agent’s decision. Hence, 
any dependence of the past on an agent’s decision is extremely fragile against changes in the 
agent’s reason. So if we do not hold the past hypothesis fixed, then Fragility explains why 
we cannot control the past in Frisch cases.17  
 Moreover, this fragility in how the past counterfactually depends on the present 
promises deeper insight into the time asymmetries of causation and causal explanation. 
Woodward (2006, 2) points out that “we tend to regard causal claims that are highly sensitive 
as defective, nonstandard, or at least importantly different from less sensitive causal claims,” 
where a causal claim “is sensitive if it holds in the actual circumstances but would not 
                                                
17 Eckhardt (2006) and Kutach (2011) also use fragility considerations to explain why we 
cannot control the past. Horwich (1987) and Frisch (2014) discuss similar physical time 
asymmetries. 
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continue to hold in circumstances that depart in various ways from the actual circumstances.” 
The fragility of counterfactual dependence in the backward direction entails that if there 
were causal relations in the backward direction, the corresponding causal claims would be 
highly sensitive in Woodward’s sense. Almost any small change to the present would make 
it be that a purported past effect of some current event would not have occurred, and so the 
corresponding causal claim would not have been true. Causal claims in the backward 
direction would thus be sensitive in Woodward’s sense. This fact then is the beginning of an 
explanation regarding why, despite counterfactual dependence of earlier events on later 
events, we do not regard later events as causes of earlier events and why we do not cite later 
events to causally explain earlier events. More work would be needed to show that the 
proposed account of the time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence is ultimately viable, 
but it has some very attractive features.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Albert’s account in terms of the past hypothesis is the most influential current account of the 
time asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. In this paper, I have shown that Albert’s 
appeal to the past hypothesis is problematic. I have argued that holding fixed the past 
hypothesis when evaluating counterfactuals is explanatorily redundant and possibly even 
counter-productive when trying to account for control and related asymmetries.  
My argument undermines one central reason for Albert’s claim that the past 
hypothesis is a fundamental physical law. A plausible constraint on fundamental physical 
laws is that they determine the nomological possibilities and thereby, together with facts 
about what actually happens, fix our world’s counterfactual structure (Hall 2012). So a good 
reason for treating the past hypothesis as a fundamental physical law would be if holding it 
fixed were necessary to explain the asymmetries associated with counterfactuals. But I have 
argued that we are in at least as good a position to explain these asymmetries if we do not 
hold the past hypothesis fixed.  
 Albert provides other reasons for treating the past hypothesis as a fundamental 
physical law, including its role in grounding the time asymmetry of Thermodynamics and 
the reliability of records. Assessing these reasons and weighing them against the above 
considerations is beyond the scope of this paper. But I hope to have shown that the role of 
the past hypothesis in accounting for the time asymmetries in our universe needs to be 
reconsidered.  
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2016 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	  
References 
 
Albert, David. 2000. Time and Chance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
---. 2015. After Physics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Blanchard, Thomas. 2016. “Physics and Causation.” Philosophy Compass 11:256–66. 
Eckhardt, William. 2006. “Causal Time Asymmetry.” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Modern Physics 37:439–66. 
Elga, Adam. 2001. “Statistical Mechanics and the Asymmetry of Counterfactual 
Dependence.” Philosophy of Science 68:S313–24.  
Fernandes, Alison. Forthcoming. “Time, Flies, and Why We Can’t Control the Past.” In 
Time’s Arrows and the Probability Structure of the World, ed. Barry Loewer, Brad 
Weslake, and Eric Winsberg. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Field, Hartry. 2003. “Causation in a Physical World.” In Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, 
ed. Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman, 435–60. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Frisch, Mathias. 2005. Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
---. 2007. “Causation, Counterfactuals, and Entropy.” In Price and Corry 2007, 351–96. 
---. 2010. “Does a Low-Entropy Constraint Prevent Us from Influencing the Past?” In 
Time, Chance, and Reduction, edited by A. Hüttemann and G. Ernst, 13–33. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
---. 2014. Causal Reasoning in Physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Hall, Ned. 2012. “Humean Reductionism about Laws of Nature: Director’s Cut.” 
Unpublished manuscript. 
Hitchcock, Christopher. 2001. “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and 
Graphs.” Journal of Philosophy 98:273–99. 
Holton, Richard. 2006. “The Act of Choice.” Philosophers’ Imprint 6:1–15. 
Horwich, Paul. 1987. Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kutach, Douglas. 2011. “The Asymmetry of Influence.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Time, ed. Craig Callender, 247–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, David. 1986a. “Causal Explanation.” In Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, 214–40. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
---. 1986b. “Causation.” In Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, 159–213. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
---. 1986c. “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow.” In Philosophical Papers, vol. 
2, 32–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Loewer, Barry. 2007. “Counterfactuals and the Second Law.” In Price and Corry 2007, 
293–326. 
---. 2012. “Two Accounts of Laws and Time.” Philosophical Studies 160:115–37. 
Maudlin, Tim. 2007. The Metaphysics within Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Paul, L.A., and Ned Hall. 2013. Causation: A User's Guide. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Price, Huw. 2007. “Causal Perspectivalism.” In Price and Corry 2007, 250–92.  
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2016 
Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) 
Please use DOI when citing or quoting 	  
---, and Richard Corry. 2007. Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
---, and Brad Weslake. 2009. “The Time-Asymmetry of Causation.” In The Oxford 
Handbook of Causation, ed. Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock, and Peter Menzies, 
414–46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Woodward, James. 2003. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
---. 2006. “Sensitive and Insensitive Causation.” Philosophical Review 115:1–50. 
